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Abstract
Fundamentally,  poverty reduction  is about bringing  new firms can enter markets,  that substandard  firms are
growth processes to  poor areas.  Because  poor areas can  allowed to fail,  and that good firms  face  few barriers to
benefit from technical  and organizational innovations  growth.  This is the definition of competition, and
made elsewhere  in the world,  it is possible today  to  competition  is what selects good firms  and thus drives
create productive jobs faster and in greater quantity than  the spread of best practice and productive jobs.
ever before.  The puzzle  is what helps spread such "best  Governments need to provide the framework in  which
practices."  Saving,  investment,  education,  resources,  and  capable  firms can  emerge. Yet,  the right mix of state
new technology  are all needed-and  fairly easy to obtain.  activity  and how  it best interacts with firms  are not fully
What is hard to obtain are the institutions that allow  understood.  Some selection  mechanism,  which allows  for
these factors of production  to be combined and  policy  experiments  and selects successful  ones,  is valuable
translated  into productive job creation.  Firms are the  key  for national,  provincial,  and local  governments.  Thus
vehicles that spread best practices  and productive  jobs to  competition  among jurisdictions and firms is an integral
areas where poor people  live.  Because we  can never be  part of dynamic social systems that hold promise for
sure which firm will be successful,  it is necessary  that  creating wealth and ending poverty.
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This paper provides perspectives on what can be done to overcome obstacles to
development and poverty reduction. It argues that the key to poverty reduction is creating
productive jobs where poor people live, which in statistics shows up as growth.
Fundamentally,  poverty reduction is not about redistributing  the benefits of growth-it is
about bringing growth processes to poor areas. Because poor areas can benefit from
technical and organizational innovations made elsewhere in the world, it is possible today
to create productive jobs faster and in greater quantity than ever before.  The puzzle is
what helps spread such "best practices."  The paper argues that saving, investment,
education, resources, and new technology are all needed-and fairly easy to obtain. What
is hard to obtain are the institutions that allow these factors of production to be combined
and translated into productive job creation.
Some important institutions develop spontaneously,  such as basic markets and small
trade, which operate even in the most desperate corners of the world. But to create and
sustain large numbers of productive jobs requires a complex web of institutions. The rise
of modern firms and modern government,  both non-market institutions that started in the
mid- 19th century, provides the critical institutional  fabric allowing factors of production
to be combined more productively.  To be truly productive,  firms need to play by certain
rules and be able and willing to co-operate. They need to respect property rights and
contracts so that they have incentives  to invest and cooperate with buyers and suppliers.
They also need to respect a variety of regulations  that condition their property rights-to
ensure that products  and production processes fit society's expectations about socially
and environmentally sound practices. Under such rules, which require government
enforcement,  small and large  firms emerge symbiotically, trading and contracting with
each other.
Firms are the vehicles that spread best practices and productive jobs to areas where poor
people live. But firms require certain routines to operate, and those routines may not
always be effective or sustainable. Because we can never be sure which firm will be
successful,  it is necessary that new firms can enter markets, that substandard firms are
allowed to fail, and that good firms face few barriers to growth. This is the definition of
competition,  and competition  is what selects good firms and thus drives the spread of best
practice  and productive jobs.
The institutional fabric of societies consisting of firmns,  government and other types of
organizations needs to combine competition and cooperation under agreed rules-a tricky
task full of unavoidable tensions.  Because the spread of best practices and more
productive jobs upsets old patterns  of production, it typically disrupts  the lives of some
people while improving those of others and in the end raises living standards broadly.
Most if  not all governments  try to help the process along not just by establishing the
basics of property rights and contract security but also by providing special support to
small farmers and businesses or to larger ones under industrial policies that provide some
protection from competition  and easier access to credit. Politically popular, such policies
can be effective in overcoming interest group resistance to reform. But their contributionWays Out of  Poverty - Diffusing Best Practices  and Creating  Capabilities  2
to productivity improvements is limited, particularly where the basics of security of
property rights and contracts-and the freedom to enter and fail-are not in place.
An alternative is broader social protection schemes such as social security systems. When
sensibly designed, these allow change to occur, while providing a safety net to
individuals.  To fund such systems productive jobs are needed  first. But a basic level of
security can also support greater risk-taking and thus enhance the scope for
experimentation  and change that bring more productive jobs in the end. Indeed,
productive societies have seen a dramatic rise in the share of government activity in the
economy, mostly due to the emergence of state-sponsored social protection. At the same
time, countries around the world, notably Scandinavian  ones, have withdrawn  from
interfering with the productive activity of firms that underpins wealth creation.
The right mix of state activity and how it best interacts with firms are not fully
understood. Partial reforms can work. But they can also fail. Some selection mechanism,
which allows for experiments and selects successful ones, is also valuable for national,
provincial, and local governments.  This competition among jurisdictions and firms is an
integral part of dynamic social systems that hold promise for creating wealth and ending
poverty.Ways Out of Povertv - Diffusing Best Practices  and Creating  Capabilities  3
II.  HOPE AND  ANGER
"First,  I would like to have work of  any kind."
- An 18-year old man, Ecuador
The challenge.  The quotation is from "Voices of the Poor,"  a World Bank survey
capturing the perspectives of poor people around the world.'  Poor people know what they
need to escape poverty. Finding a decent job or establishing a small business is the key.2
But not any job or any business will lead out of poverty. If it were simply a matter of
creating jobs, having the state employ everyone would do the trick. This has been tried
before in most parts of the world, notably in communist regimes. The key to poverty
reduction is to create productive jobs and thus wealth, not just to compile odd jobs
allowing people to scrape by. The basic sentiment comes from a man from Pakistan: "the
rich have one permanent job; the poor are rich in many jobs."3 Needed especially are jobs
and productivity improvements where poor people live, mostly in rural areas and the
peripheries of cities.
Hope. The 20th century gave more hope that poverty could be eliminated than any other
episode in human history. Average income per person, adjusted for inflation, increased at
least five times over the century, despite unprecedented  population growth from about  1.8
billion to more than 6 billion.4 At century's end, more people lived above the basic
poverty line of $1 dollar a day than even a decade before.5 And when taking a definition
of poverty broader than just income, human development in very poor countries,  even in
Mozambique,  has advanced beyond that in Italy in the late 19 th  century.6 For the first time
in history it appears that increases in income may not lead to a Malthusian increase in
population. Worldwide fertility rates peaked in the  1960s, and population growth has
since started to slow.7
Anger. And yet, the absolute number of poor people has not fallen, even though their
share in total population continues  to decline. Advances are heavily concentrated in Asia,
particularly China and India. In Africa, however, poverty rates increased over the last
three decades. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union they increased during the
decade prior to the fall of communism and faster still thereafter. Nor have two decades of
reform in Latin America prevented poverty rates from rising (figure 1). Whether all
things considered global inequality has risen or declined during the last three decades of
'Narayan  et al.,  2000.
2  Detailed studies making use of household survey data confirm this. The smgle most important  factors for
escaping from poverty are changing  labor earnings and changes in ermployment  status. See, for example,
Fields et al. (2000).
3 Narayan et al.,  2000.
4  de long, 2000.
S  Pfeffermann,  2000.
6 Crafts, 2000.
7 Umted Nations, 2001.Ways Out of  Povert&  - Diffusina  Best Practices  and Creating  Capabilities  4
the 20th century remains hotly disputed.8 In any case, roughly 1.2 billion people still live
on less that $1 a day, and 2.8 billion on less then $2 a day.9
Figure 1: Shares of world population living on less than  $1 a day
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Worldwide, the average income per person is about $6,000 a year, no more than that for
the United States in 1900, then the richest country in the world. The world has thus
shown that it can produce enough for everyone to lead a better life. But many people
have not benefited. And so, the century that has given rise to unprecedented hope has also
given rise to anger that many people are left out. Precisely because we can now imagine  a
world without poverty, we can be angry about the slow progress. In the words of Nobel
laureate Joseph Stiglitz: "The experience of the past fifty years has demonstrated that
development  is possible, but not inevitable."'0
" Milanovic,  1999; Ravallion,  2000;  Sala-i-Martin, 2002.
9 World Bank, 2002a.
'O Stiglitz, 1998a.Ways Out of  Poverty - Diffising Best Practices  and Creating Capabilities  5
III.  BASIC WAYS TO PROMOTE PRO-POOR GROWTH
Alternatives to market economies.  So what can be done for poor people to benefit from
wealth creation? Today there are fewer alternative approaches to economic systems than
at any time since Karl Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto in 1848. Some still hope for
non-market solutions, but they are struggling, as exemplified  in a recent speech by Joao
Amaral,  a reformist member of the Portuguese Communist Party: "We are not social
democrats or market-friendly  socialists. Communism  means replacing capitalism with
something better, even if we do not yet know exactly what that will be."'  Maybe at some
future date a completely different economic system will emerge. For now we have to
make some kind of system making use of markets.
Redistribution of income.  The question becomes what pro-poor policies mean in market
economies.  Some focus on redistributing  incomes. For example,  a guaranteed basic
income for all was recently proposed by the Basic Income European Network."2 The
massive redistribution required for such a plan on a global scale would require that
economic growth is adequate  to fund it. In addition,  it requires willingness of rich
countries to fund the plan. Yet, the official development aid of all nations amounts to less
than $0.15 for each person living on less than $1 a day, and most of that has to be repaid.
Compare that with the Republic of Korea, which took about 10 years to generate more
income for its citizens  from the manufacturing  sector alone than all of the world's
development aid together (figure 2).
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Creating productive employment.  Even doubling the world's official aid and
transforming all loans into grants would not achieve sustained economic growth in
countries and areas where poor people live. The hope for poor people lies in productivity
t' Wise, 2002.
12  Williams, 2002.Ways Out of  Poverty - Diflfismng Best Practices  and Creating Capabilities  6
growth, not in redistribution.  Opinion polls in Latin America show that the poorer people
are, the more they place their hopes on productivity growth than on redistribution (figure
3).
Figure 3: What do people think their country needs most to get ahead-more
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Most debates about pro-poor growth today center on means to provide opportunity to
poor people by improving their health and education,' 3 by providing them access to
credit,'4 by connecting them to the global market,'5 by helping to create risk insurance
schemes, and by creating jobs through stimulating overall growth in poor countries and
regions. 16  Required is deeper understanding of what such interventions can accomplish
and how to implement them effectively.  But the basics are clear.  Growth processes need
to spread to areas where poor people live or where they can migrate.
3 World Bank, 2002b.
4 Morduch,  1999; Robinson, 2001.
15 See World Bank, 2002b for examples of how information and communications  technology is being used
around the world to connect producers in low-income or remote areas directly to buyers and to provide
them with access to market and business-related  information.
6 Stern, 2001.Ways Out of  Poverty - Diffising Best Practices  and  Creating  Capabilities
IV.  DRIVERS OF GROWTH AND JOB CREATION
"There is a tendency to see development as the
accumulation of something necessary. For  a while it was
infrastructure...  human capital.... It has been other things
as well. There's obviously truth in those  paradigms, but in
a deeper sense, societies that succeed in developing are
societies where the fairly common individual  pursuit  of
selfish objectives lead to benign social outcomes because of
checks and balances in governments, because of  enforced
private  property  rights, because of  incentives  for creativity
and entrepreneurship.  "
Lawrence  Summers
A.  Accumulation  of capital and ideas
To understand pro-poor growth,  one needs to understand growth.  Clearly, growth
requires the accumulation  of various types of capital-financial,  physical, natural,  and
human. Most important, the accumulated technical and organizational  innovations of
humankind can, in principle, enable poor countries to catch up fairly fast with richer
ones. But simply making resources and innovations available does not lead to growth.17
Finance. Poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa received capital transfers in the form of
development aid averaging  some 10 percent of GDP a year over the  1990s, a very high
level of inflows relative to the size of the economies. But this did not translate into
sustained growth.  Instead, Africa became the region of the world with the highest
incidence of capital flight.'8 Estimates reveal that almost 40 percent of private wealth  is
held outside the region.19
Investment. Nor do high investment rates translate automatically into high growth. Most
dramatic here are the former communist countries, where investment rates of 30 or even
40 percent of GDP were amnong the highest in the world. But they imploded in a
spectacular way. Hong Kong and Singapore had similar growth per person, but Hong
Kong did it with significantly lower investment  levels.20 The United States still achieves
strong growth with investment rates just below 20 percent of GDP.
Natural resources. Natural resources, fuels, and other agricultural and nonagricultural
commodities remain critical for economies everywhere.  But over the 20th century the
price of  non-fuel commodities fell by four-fifths in real terms, while per capita income
grew five-fold (figure 4). Fuel prices have also declined slightly as they were buoyed by
7 Easterly and Levine,2001;  Temnple,  1999.
World Bank, 2000b.
" Collier and Gunning,  1999.
20 Young,  1992.Ways Out of Povertv - Diffusing  Best Practices  and Creating Capabilities  8
OPEC during the last 30 years. So, despite massive population growth, the relative
scarcity of natural resources has shrunk. Nor is possession of resources the key to growth.
Botswana (diamonds) and Chile (copper) have benefited from their resource
endowments, but the possession of natural resources can also be a curse.21 The "curse of
oil" characterizes  the fact that countries endowed with high priced, large volumes of oil
are not growing much or are even shrinking. Look at Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela.
Figure 4: Intelligence  is scarce-natural  resources abundant
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Human capital. Even investment in education does not easily translate into superior
growth.22 Educational progress in Africa was much faster relative to its starting point than
in East Asia, but did not bring higher growth. Educational improvements  overall in the
developing world in fact coincided with declining growth rates during the last 40 years.
Detailed household surveys also suggest that educational levels are not critical in
explaining who escapes from poverty.
Access  to resources and capital. None of this is to say that finance, investment, natural
resources, or education do not matter. They do, but by themselves they are not enough.
And on the positive side, it has become easier to move finance into good investment
opportunities.  Trade barriers have been lowered, so it has become easier to acquire
capital goods that embody new technologies.  And the education levels needed for income
growth in poor countries do not appear to be too difficult to achieve.
21  Gelb et al.,  1988; Sachs and Warner,  2001.
22 Pritchett,  1996.Ways Out of Poverty - Diffusing Best Practices  and Creatinm  Capabilities  9
The diffusion of ideas and income  growth. Technical and organizational innovations
have led to an unprecedented creation of wealth (box 1). Innovations have the nice
feature that, unlike physical objects, they can be used over and over again,  if they can be
communicated.2 3 It is this feature of ideas that makes it possible for poor countries today
to raise incomes much faster than has ever before been feasible.
Box  1: The speed of wealth creation
Before  the  18kh century per capita income grew very slowly. When they grew, population growth nsked
offsetting  any progress, just as T. Robert Malthus argued at the beginning of the mdustnal revolution. In
the run-up to the industrial revolution per capita income started nsing. However,  it took some 350 years
for incomes to double in pre-industrial Europe. During the industrial revolution, the richest country,
Britain, initially (1780-  1830) saw average  individual incomes rise at a speed that would have required
175 years to double them. Thereafter growth picked up. Britain was able to double per capita incomes
within a span of 65 years in the late  19"h century. At the time no other country could rival this
performance.  However, by the second half of the 20d' century,  a whole range of countries, for example
Botswana, Chile,  China, Ireland,  Japan, Korea and Thailand were able to grow for sustained penods at
rates that doubled per capita income in about  10 to 15 years.
Source: Cameron (1991); Crafts (2000).
For the first time in human history it has become possible for large numbers of people to
escape from poverty within a life span. Today people in poorer countries can make use of
new technology, new learning, and better ways of doing things that were developed in
more advanced economies. They can learn from organizational  innovation in both firms
and governments.  Openness to learn from other countries-or within a country from
centers of growth-is thus critical  for rapid income growth and poverty reduction.24
The diffusion of ideas has also become  easier. Many more ideas are recorded, and the
means of communication have become  faster, more efficient and more ubiquitous. Ideas
might not move quite as easily as finance these days, but one can acquire new ideas
embodied in imported machines, buy technology licenses,  study at home or abroad, and
use the Internet. And Korea shows that acquiring new technology and ideas from
overseas is fairly cheap. It spent less than 1.5 percent of the increase in GDP over 1973-
79 on the technology licenses that underpinned manufacturing growth.2 5
23  Romer,  1993.
24 Note that the static efficiency gais from trade liberalization cannot explain the main benefits from
openness. Static gains from trade  are typically one-off benefits  in the order of 2 percent of GDP or maybe 4
to 6 percent of GDP in the presence of product differentiation or economies of scale. These are important
but not nearly as important  as the gains from learning that drive successful  growth processes.
25  See Olson, 1996. More generally, while innovators  can earn a fair deal of money, they rarely receive the
full rents  from their innovation.  For example,  Thomas Alva Edison received but a fraction of the benefits
that electric  light created. Even patent protection, unless excessive, just affords the innovating firm on
average with a normal rate of return on the cost of invention. Patent protection is meant to prevent that new
ideas are simply made available for free so that mventors retain an mcentive to spend time and money to
mnovate.  But most of the benefits of successful  inventions are passed to consumers in competitive markets.Ways Out of  Povertv - Diffusing Best Practices  and Creating  CapabiliIes  10
B.  Impediments and Traps
Types of impediments  and traps. If the provision of capital does not drive growth, if
finance, capital goods and know-how are not very hard to obtain, why is it difficult for
some countries to grow? One set of arguments has to do with a variety of "traps" or
lasting impediments that prevent countries from growing rapidly. They may suffer from
being small or landlocked or plagued by inclement climates.2 6 They may suffer from
ethnic strife or civil war.27 They may have policy and institutional rigidities induced by
vested interests.28 They may suffer from cultural biases or a lack of trust, a critical part of
social capital.29
Escapees  from traps and impediments.  Whatever the trap, some country has been able
to escape from it. All countries that are developed today have over long periods of time
emerged from "hopeless" situations. Who would have thought at the time of the thirty-
years war (1618 to 1648) that Germany would ever be an economic powerhouse?
Today many countries have escaped from their trap fairly fast by historical standards.
*  Adverse climate conditions can be overcome.  Tropical Singapore is a rich
country, and Malaysia and Thailand have also performed well as did Venezuela
over most of the 20th century until the curse of oil set in during the late 1970s. At
the other end of the climate spectrum Scandinavian countries boomed during the
th~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3 20th century including isolated, inhospitable Iceland.3 0
*  Remote location need not prevent development either. Landlocked,  tiny Botswana
has consistently been a star performer in recent decades. Landlocked Uganda
emerged very rapidly from the days of civil war and dictatorship  and experienced
a strong growth episode in the 1990s. The tiny island of Mauritius became one of
Africa's best performing economies.
*  Recovery is possible from civil strife. Civil war ended in El Salvador in 1992.  Six
years later per capita income had increased by 17 percent. Its human development
index was up 8 percent, all without increasing the debt burden. Indeed, El
Salvador became the third country in Latin America to receive an investment
grade bond rating in 1998 - before Mexico.
*  Countries that languish for many decades can turn around. Ireland, which suffered
decades of emigration and economic stagnation, overtook the United Kingdom in
per capita income in the 1990s, driven by productivity growth from foreign
investment.
*  Even deeply entrenched dysfunctional  institutions may be overcome.  Several'
former communist countries-constrained  by a formidable set of  growth
26 Gallup et al.,  1998.
27 Collier, 2000; Collier and Gunning,  1999.
28 Acemoglu and Robinson,  2000; Havrylyshyn and Odling-Smee, 2000; Hellman,  1998.
29 Collier,  1998; Fukuyama, 2000.
30 There was hardly a free-standing house in Iceland a hundred years ago and people lived half underground
in grass-covered huts.Ways Out of Poverty - Diffysinj  Best Practices  and Creating Capabilities  11
restraining institutions, policies, and vested interests-turned around within a
decade, particularly China and Central Europe.
Arrested development.  Precisely because many countries have become so much richer,
we now see that some may run into "traps" at higher incomes. Argentina, once among the
most advanced in the world, has stagnated relative to others  since the 1930s. Stagnation
could also befall  Japan. The communist countries that initially grew in the early phases of
industrialization are the most dramatic illustration of the phenomenon. We do not know
how to predict such cases, but it seems clear that, after initial success, development may
be arrested for some time.
Overall, while many countries have emerged from traps, many others have not or are
getting trapped again. The upshot appears to be that there are indeed a variety of factors
that make it hard for a country to develop, but they can in principle be overcome - often
in fairly short time.  What it takes to do so is the issue.
C.  The key to development:  Capable institutions
Countries. One way to reduce poverty is to allow poor people to move to richer
countries.  Immigrants in the United States of America produce more than 4.5 times more
there than in their country of origin. Their skill level is the same. They benefit from extra
and more advanced physical capital in the United States. But that explains only about a
third of the difference (figure 5). The main explanation is the capability of institutions-
be they firms or governments-that allow individuals to perform at higher levels of
productivity.
Figure 5: Factor accumulation  accounts for only
a fraction of income differences  (in percent)
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Source:  Calculatons based on Hendricks (2002).
Looking at output in 127 countries, Hall and Jones (1998) find that human and physical
capital differences account  for only a modest amount of the difference (figure 6). TheWays Out of Poverty - DiffiLsing Best Practices  and Creating  Capabilities  12
biggest factor remains hard to capture.  It is not new that unexplained  residuals in
statistical studies of growth are large for particular countries.  But comparing
productivity across countries shows the full extent of the elusive "unexplained  residual."
Figure 6: The difference in output per worker is due to
difference In Institutional environment
(ratio of the 5 richest to the 5 poorest countries)
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Various things have to come together to raise productivity and incomes.  For example, the
more open an economy is-and with it presumably the ability to learn-the more
education becomes useful.3 2 For another example, the higher the level of domestic
education, the more productive foreign investment becomes.3 3 All this points to the
power of institutions that enhance the division of labor.
Regions.  Productivity also differs among regions within countries.  Consider the coastal
and interior provinces  in China, or the North East of Brazil compared with Sao Paolo.
Even where labor is mobile and the free movement of goods, services, and capital reigns,
significant productivity differences can persist. A study of Italy suggests that long-
standing differences between the North and South of Italy reflect differences in trust
among people based on long-standing patterns of behavior, what the author calls "social
capital."34 In short, the environment people operate in makes a real difference  to
productivity.
Cities and clusters.  Also critical, cities tend to be more productive than other parts of a
country. More ideas are generated there,  and incomes are higher. Why? Because cities
allow for flexible labor markets and work arrangements, production and subcontracting
methods, and easier flows of ideas (figure 7).35
31 Denison,  1967; Solow, 1957.
32 Krueger,  Alan B. and Mikael Lindahl, 2001; Lopez et al.,  1998.
33 Borenzstein et al.,  1994; World Bank, 200 la.
34 Putnarl,  1993.
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Figure 7:  Location of new  product innovation
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Clusters of firms as in  Silicon Valley (information and communication technology)  and
in  Northern Italy (textiles and garments) provide benefits similar to those in  cities.  '  As
executives  in  Silicon Valley expressed it: ". . .People change jobs without changing
carpools.. ." and "...the network in  Silicon Valley transcends company loyalties. We treat
people fairly and they are loyal to us, but there  is an even higher level of loyalty - to their
network..."3 7 Cities are forms of clusters, the best known way to incubate small
enterprises.
Firms and the diffusion  of best practice. Then there are firms.3 8 Large, multi-plant
firms-which exhibit some features similar to those of clusters, such as flexible internal
labor markets, loyalty to the larger firm, flexible internal contracting-are more
productive than smaller ones.  In many developing countries foreign firms are more
productive than local ones are, suggesting a way to import some types of capability.
Most important, firms spread best practices  and thus wealth through channels  that may
cross national boundaries. They equally function within a particular country.  De facto,
studies of cross-border links between firms have attracted more attention.  Hence, some
of the following discussion has a flavor of international learning channels.  However,  the
same or similar mechanisms  are at work within countries.
Productive, new entrants from other areas. One way of improving firm-level
performance  is for more productive firms to move into new markets through new
investments or through mergers or acquisitions. Across borders we call this foreign direct
investment. Foreign firms and joint ventures with foreign firms typically exhibit higher
productivity than local firms in  developing countries.3 9 Foreign firms employ mostly
local workers and managers, training them on the job in  new technical and organizational
36 Porter,  1998.
37 Saxenian,  1996.
38 Sutton, 2000.
39Barberis et al.,  1996; Blomstrom and Sjoholm,  1998; Djankov and Murrell,  2002; Earle and Estrm,  1998;
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practices.  The superior performance of direct foreign investors tends to provide them
with greater market share in their sector. Over time, local competitors may be able to
catch up as well, but initially they tend to lose market share.40 Similar processes are at
work within countries. Efficient companies  from one part of a country move into other
regions and improve productivity there.
Learning by buyers and suppliers. Subcontractors to foreign investors appear to be
helped by their presence.  Dealing with demanding foreign investors helps them upgrade
their quality and reduce costs. In varying degrees foreign investors provide active support
to their suppliers to improve performance.4 '  Contracting  also takes place across borders.
Export opportunities provide the competent domestic firms with the option to expand
their market, and firms can learn to upgrade their productivity,  as studies of firms from
East Asia and Mexico  suggest (figure  8).42 Demanding customers  in high-quality markets
are a key force driving performance improvements.
Figure 8: Exporters  spend more on training
and acquiring foreign technology
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Firms as incubators for new entrepreneurs.  Another important way for new and more
productive  firms to emerge is for people who learned in one firm to leave and set up their
own firm. Take the garment industry in Bangladesh, where locals learned  from a Korean
company,  Daewoo (box 2). They later set up their own businesses in Bangladesh, which
in turn produced more small entrepreneurs.  In a short time the garment industry became
Bangladesh's leading export industry, accounting for almost 75 percent of the export
earnings in 2001. In India the most efficient machine tool company was set up by
employees from older, less efficient machine tool companies.
40 Aitken and Harrison,  1999; Djankov and Murrell, 2002.
4t Batra and Tan, 2000; Batra and Tan, 1995.
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Box 2: The role of policy reforms and diffusion of good practices in the growth of
the Bangladesh  garments  industry
The garment industry in Bangladesh  grew from nothing in 1979 to about $5 billion of exports per
year-a little over three-quarters of the current annual export earnings in Bangladesh.  This
phenomenal  growth is due to the diffusion of good practices,  from foreign to one local enterprise
and from the local enterprise to many others. It is also due to a number of policy and
administrative  improvements that opened up investment opportunities  for local entrepreneurs.
It all started in  1979 with the collaboration between the Korean company, Daewoo, and the
Bangladeshi enterprise, Desh Garments.  Daewoo  did not make any capital investment in Desh, but
it signed a five-year contract to help Desh purchase machinery and fabric (some of it on credit
from Daewoo), to set up the factory and market the garments.  The contract also included training
of Desh employees in Daewoo's plant in Korea and at Desh facilities  in Bangladesh.  About  130
Desh employees received very intensive training in technical production skills, management, and
marketing at Daewoo in Korea. They returned to Bangladesh with technical production and
marketing know-how plus an appreciation of the corporate culture required for success in export
markets.  Daewoo sent its own technicians  to Desh-to help set up the machines, oversee  quality
assurance  in production, and train Desh workers who had not been to Korea.
Garment production began in  1980 with 450 machines and 500 workers. By June  1981,  Desh
already felt that it was ready to operate on its own and terminated its contract with Daewoo.  In
1980 Desh produced 43,000 shirts at a value of $56,000. By 1987 sales had risen to 2.3 million
shirts worth $5.3 million. The quality of Desh's garments had also improved significantly.  The
unit export price increased  by 75% from $1.30 to $2.30. Between  1980 and 1987, Desh expanded
from 450 machines to 750, and its workforce increased from 500 to 1,400. By 1987,  Desh was
handling its own export marketing  and was buying all its raw material from sources  other than
Daewoo.
More interesting, of the initial batch of 130 employees who visited Korea in  1980,  115 left the
company by mid-1981  to start their own garment-exporting businesses and began replicating
Desh's success  in other factories. By  1985 Bangladesh had 700 garment-export manufacturing
factories.
Source: Mahmood (2002).
Many successful small companies  are founded by ex-employees of larger companies,
where they learned their job. Often they learned about opportunities that their previous
employer did not recognize or did not wish to exploit. The former employer might have
been stuck in routines that were too hard to change or might have been reluctant to
embark on new ventures that would undermine or cannibalize successful product  lines.43
The most detailed attempt at studying the phenomenon comes from the United States:
more than 70 percent of new ventures were set up by employees who got their business
idea when employed by another company (figure 9).
43 Chnstensen,  1997.Ways Out ofPovert  - Diffising Best Practices  and Creating Capabilities  16
Figure 9: Origin of Innovation  In the United States
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D.  Poverty reduction: The diffusion  of best practice and the creation of
capability
"... The engine (of development) is the advance of
technology and the difusion of  technical capacities
ofpeople, firms and governments... "
Robert Wade
"...If as I believe, the difference in efficiency between U.S.
and developing-countryfirms is typically large, there is
much room for quite rapid improvements in the developing
countries as they learn how to adopt and adapt  already-
known techniques  from the advanced countries... "
Armold  Harberger
So what does all this imply for poverty reduction?"  Critical to creating wealth is the
capability of institutions that allow people to work together and that create productive
jobs in the process. For poverty to be eradicated quickly, these institutions must be open
to learning and adapting know-how that already exists-and be capable of applying it
efficiently.  The traditional factors of production are not too hard to obtain: natural
resources,  capital goods, finance, ideas, and reasonably competent labor.
44 Whether we call it poverty reduction or wealth creation or growth, the widespread rise in individual
incomes requires productivity improvements  and the provision of better products or services. After all
standards of living improve when people can get existing products  or services at lower cost or better ones  at
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But because poor people cannot simply move to areas where capable institutions already
exist, pro-poor growth involves diffusing best practices and capabilities to areas where
poor people live.
The mechanics of organizing institutions can be learned. For firms, organizational
practices can also be "imported," through foreign direct investment or the movement of
firms within countries. The really critical local element of good institutions that is hard to
import is the ability of people to work well together-their behavior and their culture.
Even firms cannot transplant cultures.  A study of a large firm in Italy with operations in
both the North and the South shows that worker behavior varies significantly in different
parts of the country. When workers from the North move South, they start behaving like
those in the South and vice versa (figure  10).
Figure 10: Frequencies  of misconduct of workers In an  Italian firm, by region of birth
Workers In the North  Workers in the South
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0.012  0.012
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V.  CORE INSTITUTIONS:  MARKETS,  FIRMS AND GOVERNMENTS
"Trying to stop a market is like trying to stop a river.  "
A Vietnamese proverb
a nation's economic growth and competitive strength
rest on more than natural  resources, labor and managerial
skills, available capital or even the size of internal  markets.
The  wealth of nations during the past hundred years has
been based more on the ability of industrial enterprises to
adopt  and  to  develop  ...  technologies and  to  devise
administrative  structures to co-ordinate the ... processes of
production and distribution.  "
Alfred Chandler
"...What distinguishes modern government
from personal  control is its unremitting
character. To be governed is to be
subjected to the regular  pressure  of  an
authority  operating  to fixed rules...  .In the
full sense of  the word, it is arguable  that
nobody was governed before the later  1 9 ah
century..."
Jean Dunbabin45
Spontaneous  emergence  of markets.  Markets are institutions that arise spontaneously
even without government intervention.  In the most desolate places merchants ply their
trade and supply people with goods and services.  Lawless places  like Somalia today
show that trade in almost all goods at world prices is being organized in the absence of
government. Even cell phone service with pre-paid cards is available in Somalia as is
basic electricity service - for those who can pay.  Tiny enterprises  and farms operate in
all societies.46
The rise of firms and government.  Substantial and sustained wealth creation requires a
complex division of labor and more complex organizations  than arise spontaneously
almost everywhere.  The rise of modem firms, operating in markets shaped by modem
government, provides  the institutional fabric  for factors of production  to combine more
and more productively.  To be productive, firms need to play by certain rules and be able
and willing to co-operate.  They need to respect basic rules such as property rights and
contracts so that they have incentives to invest and co-operate with buyers and suppliers.
To ensure that products and production processes  fit society's expectations about socially
45 Quoted in Fmner,  1997, p. 70.
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and environmentally sound practices firms need to respect a variety of regulations that
condition their property rights.  Under such rules, which require the government to
establish and enforce them,  a symbiosis of small and large firms emerges, which
compete, trade  and contract with each other.  Consider now the key features  that
characterize effective institutional fabrics combining firns, markets and governments.
A.  Experiments and routines-freedom to enter and to fail
Firms spread best practices and productive jobs to areas where poor people live. But the
diffusion is not straightforward. As discussed before, various channels for improving
firm-level perforrnance  exist that transfer best practice already invented elsewhere.
However, not all firrns are capable of benefiting from them - even when new firm entry
is allowed  and when openness to new methods of organization and production exist.
There are two fundamental reasons for this. First, all entrepreneurial  activity is fraught
with uncertainty and thus requires experiments.  Second, firms, or any organizations  need
to create routines to cope with complex tasks. So failure is unavoidable for firms that
make the wrong bet or choose unsustainable routines.
Experiments.  Start with uncertainty.  Adopting best practice is not straightforward.  Even
simple production technologies, such as planting new farm crops, require adaptation to
local circumstances.  More complex  technologies, such as car manufacturing, require
extensive learning on the job. It took Korea's Hyundai corporation  14 months of trials to
design its first prototype car. It then took experiments with  11 prototypes, 2,888 engine
design changes, 97 test engines,  and more than 200 test transmissions and 150 test
vehicles  to produce its first commercial  car in 1992.47
Routines. Now consider routines. The Indian machine tools industry shows that the staff
of mediocre firms could do much better than the firms they worked in. Management may
not have listened to them, may not have given them a chance, or may have been unable to
restructure  existing operations. The old companies were stuck in routines that prevented
them from improving.
There is no avoiding routines. But there often are different ways of pursuing a productive
activity. Even in everyday life we benefit from routines that simplify our tasks. Routines
are even more important when it comes to aligning work practices in a firm. They are not
bureaucratic  aberrations. They are a way of  coping with complexity.  But they may fail to
deliver. They are a consequence  of what economists call bounded rationality.
B.  Competition-the mechanism to select the most productive firms
Information problems, uncertainty, and the limited ability to cope with complexity are the
root causes of unavoidable failure of firms. So for firms to adopt best practice, there must
be mechanisms that deal reasonably well with the failure of firms. Such mechanisms need
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to allow physical assets, ideas, people, and funds to be used again in new and better ways
when a firm fails. This is where the competition in markets comes in. Competitive
markets select firms that pursue particular experiments or routines. They also provide
incentives for market participants  to improve and to adjust when they are facing failure.
In some cases, incumbent firms adapt successfully. In others, new entrants drive out non-
performing firms.
Over the last twenty years considerable work has been carried out to understand better the
way markets with firms work.  Most of this work covers advanced countries.48 However,
a significant amount of work has also been carried out in developing countries of all
types.  The picture is similar in developed as well as developing countries with the main
difference that developing economies tend to have smaller firms than advanced
economies (figure  1). 49
Figure 11: Distribution of employment  by firm size
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Heterogeneity  among firms. Traditional  economic textbooks treat markets  as if all firms
are efficient, driven by the incentives from the price signals in markets. When demand
increases new firms would enter,  and when it decreases some incumbents would fail. In
reality the picture is quite different.  Typically existing firms are not similarly efficient.
Instead, they are quite heterogeneous with substantial dispersion  in productivity among
firms and among sectors. A detailed review of firm-level performance in 44 different
48 Caves  1998; Sutton,  1997; Tybout, 2000.
49 Audretsch,  2000; Aw, 2001; Nugent and Yhee, 2001. Also  see the World Bank's RPED micro-studies  for
Afnca over the last decade (A list of available  studies can be found at
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manufacturing  sectors in Mexico shows in each sector that some firms add value while
some barely contribute and others destroy value.50 The average productivity of firms in
different sectors in India varies substantially,  and remains significantly below best
practice (figure  12).
Competition and the dispersion of productivity.  In general, bringing average practice
closer to best practice is of enormous value for wealth creation.  Individual firms often
have similar opportunities to learn and improve, but fail to do so for the reasons given
above.  Competition turns out to be the key to bringing average practice closer to best
practice.  Hence competition is a key part of the diffusion mechanism for best practice.  A
number of studies support this for countries such as Brazil, India, Korea, Japan, Russia
and Thailand.5"
Figure 12: Indla - Current and  potential labor productivity
(Indexed  to US,  1998 =  100)
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removed.  Most of the productivity improvements are expected to come from  rationalizing the workforce,
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Source:  McKinsey Global Institute (2001).
Entry and exit patterns. The key element in competition is the freedom to enter the
market and to fail. Free entry means that exit from markets must be possible for
substandard enterprises.  Where inefficient but politically well-connected  firms are
sustained through protection or subsidies by governments or through bail-outs by
50 Harberger,  1998.
5' Driemeier, 2001; McKinsey Global Institute, various  years.Ways Out of  Poverty - Diffusing Best Practices  and Creating  Capabilities  22
financial institution, new firms can compete only with difficulty.  They have difficulty
obtaining credit, and they tend not to enter.
When entry is possible, new firms do not enter only when demand is up, and old firms do
not leave only when demand declines. Every year around 5  to 20 percent of all firms
enter the market and a similar number of older firms go out of business. Most new firms
are small, and some 40-60 percent go out of business within five years after entering.
Data from developing countries suggest that the average new entrant is a little more
productive than firms exiting the market. In most economies,  the turnover of firms helps
increase productivity.  In part this reflects people being successful who have previously
failed. In part it reflects new entrants altogether.
Figure  13: Plant turnover and market  share of entrants
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Source: Tybout (2000).
Opportunity for small businesses and farms. Many of the key measures to help small
farms and micro-enterprises  are not fundamentally different from those affecting other
firms. Hernando de Soto has demonstrated in writing and in his experiments with setting
up new small firms that burdensome  entry regulations, red tape, bureaucratic harassment,
and the absence of clear property rights and contract security make it impossible for
many small entrepreneurs to establish themselves,  to become formal, and to grow. That
spotlights the importance of programs to reduce entry regulations, reduce bureaucratic
harassment, and clarify and formalize property rights (box 3).
Box  3: Property rights and poverty reduction
According to Hernando  de Soto (2000), the total value of the fixed property held but not legally
owned by the poor in developing countries is around $9.3 trillion. This is  93 times the amount of
official development assistance to developing countries over the past 30 years and 20 times the
stock of foreign direct investment in developing  countries between  1989 and  1999. But, because
the ownership of  these assets is not formalized, the people in poor countries cannot use them as
collateral to raise cash.Ways Out of Poverty - Diffusing Best Practices  and Creatinz Capabilities  23
Field research has shown that the reason why businessespstay informal  and landowners do not
register their property is not so much because they have to pay taxes but because they are usually
hindered by the bureaucracy.  For example,  de Soto  and a team of his researchers tried to register a
one-man clothing workshop that they had set up outside Lima, Peru. It took 289 days, involving
many hours of filling forms, traveling by bus into central Lima, and queuing up to see the relevant
officials, to register their micro-enterprise.  The whole operation cost $1,231 - 31 times the
monthly minimum  wage in Peru.
In Malawi, houses are built on "customary"  land, i.e.  land that the residents have no formal title to
but that has been cultivated by their family for generations.  The village chief usually oversees any
disputes about boundaries.  If a family breaks the rules of the tribe or leaves the property
unattended, the chief has the power to take the land away and give it to someone else. The contract
may be oral, or it may be written and signed by the chief. The problem is that no bank will accept
it as a collateral. The land and the property built on it turns  out to be what Hemando de Soto calls
"dead" capital.
All rich industrialized countries have clear, enforceable and almost inclusive property rights.
Although better property laws are not the only reason why some countries  are better off than
others, de Soto  insists that they make a significant difference.
Source: De Soto (2000).
Internal growth. Productivity growth comes not only from entry and exit, but also from
the growth of existing firms responding to market incentives.  Some of  the new entrants
turn out to be successful and the best become  large firms.52 Productivity growth also
comes from large firms branching out and entering new markets, sometimes through
mergers and acquisitions of promising firms. As good firms become large they tend on
average to have higher productivity than small firms. But the highest growth rates are
found among small companies that happen to be particularly efficient. Firms are
productive not because they have a particular size but because they are good.53
In a new industry, small firms play the prime role in innovation and productivity
development (box 4). The good firms continue to improve through internal growth,
taking over less well-managed  companies or buying up promising small firms that need
capital.54 Once firms have proven themselves and become large,  they remain more
productive  and last much longer than the average smaller firm. Indeed, many large firms
are like collections  of small ones. They operate an internal market for corporate control,
which can be superior to that of the broader market. And they owe their success to their
ability to allocate people, capital, ideas, and assets better than firms operating at arms-
length from each other.55 But, there is no guarantee,  and large firms may also fail
eventually.
52 Rajan and Zingales, 1998.
"  Aw, 2001.
54 Ravenscraft and Scherer,  1987.
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Box 4: Markets,  innovation and the state
In the 1920s and 30s,  around  100,000 different varieties of airplane were flown. All over the
world, enthusiastic inventors were selling airplanes to intrepid pilots and to fledging airlines.
Many of the pilots crashed, and many of the airlines became bankrupt. Of 100,000 types of
airplane, about  100 survived to form the basis of modem aviation. The evolution of airplane was a
strictly Darwinian process  in which almost all the varieties of airplane  failed, just as almost all
species became extinct. Because of the rigorous selection, the few surviving airplanes are reliable,
economical,  and safe.
Source:  Dyson (1998).
The symbiosis  of large and small firms. All sectors in all market economies have a mix
of many small, fewer medium-size, and a few large companies.  The average size varies
with economies of scale between sectors, but within sectors there are firns of many
different sizes - not like in the textbooks that suggest all firms in an industry should look
similar, reflecting relevant economies of scale. Small, medium, and large firms do not
just exist next to each other in markets. They also interact through buyer-seller
relationships,  through various co-operative arrangements,  through credit relations.  Many
times intricate networks of firms exist, within large companies, between large and smaller
ones and in clusters of various types.
The way that a firm enters, grows, and exits varies from country to country, an area little
studied so far. A recent OECD study shows that the average new entrant in the United
States is less efficient than existing firms. But entry is valuable because it allows new
ideas to be tried out and the companies  that turn out to be good can easily grow to
become larger. Most productivity growth in the United States is thus due to the internal
growth of firms and not to the entry of more efficient firms. But in several European
countries,  the entry of better firms accounts for a large part of productivity growth, and
internal growth appears less effective.  This may reflect banriers to growth in those
countries,  such as labor regulations for firms above small sizes (figure 14).  In developing
countries very small informal enterprises proliferate,  preferring to remain informal
because of the burden of regulations and taxes on formal firms.Ways Out of Povertv - Diffising Best Practices  and Creating Capabilities  25
Figure  14: Decomposition  of multifactor productivity  growth
In manufacturing
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In this ecology of firms, markets leave ample room for new organizational  species to
emerge,  spanning atomistic small firms, large hierarchical finns, internal firm markets  for
corporate control,  and all sorts of co-operative  arrangements  among firms. Customer
demand provides the main feedback mechanism, as the firms survive that meet customer
demand most effectively.  The diffusion of best practice is accomplished this well-
functioning  ecology, not by any single measure or any single type of firm. Governments
shape the ecology and the niches allowed by the way they set property rights, regulations,
taxes and other relevant parameters.Ways Out of  Povertv - Diffusing Best Practices  and Creating Capabilities  26
VI.  Market failure and the politics of change
When it comes to generating growth or establishing "competitiveness",  special
government  support beyond allowing the ecology of firms to work is often justified with
reference to market failures that may plague learning processes and access to finance.
Learning needs time, hence it is argued that certain sectors that have potential for growth
might need temporary protection of some type until they are ready to face the gale of full
international  competition.  Learning also is to a degree embodied in individuals. When
firms spend resources to train individuals the latter may decide to leave  and reap the
benefits for themselves.  Hence firms might be overly reluctant to invest in training.56
When it comes to access to finance,  financial institutions may not be willing to lend to
small and medium enterprises,  because they have little track record, are likely to go
bankrupt within a few years and are typically dependent on a single owner or just a few
persons, who might be affected by illness or other sudden changes in life.
Large firms as institutions to cope with market failure. Special institutional
innovations  are needed to cope with such market failures.  The larger firm itself is
precisely such an institution.  It is in fact, the first line of defense against market failure.
It is capable of building a track record vis-a-vis financial  institutions.  It is less dependent
on individuals than smaller firms. It can invest in small subsidiaries  while they learn and
it is more likely to retain staff and benefit from investment in training.
Collateral and credit information systems.  As a second line of defense, governments
can help with access to credit by establishing functioning property rights systems that
allow collateral systems to function so that individuals and small finns can get access to
credit.57 In fact, everywhere  in the world most of small enterprise finance is secured
through collateral, for example through mortgages  on the owner's real estate.  Credit
information systems that help track the payment record of individuals and small firms are
another key mechanism to help small market participants to establish their credit, and
hence access to finance.
Support programs for small and medium enterprises and farmers.  Beyond these
basic measures,  on which there is relatively widespread consensus, governments can
establish further programs to support particularly small and medium-sized  firms.
Directed and subsidized credit programs  for small urban and rural enterprises and farms
exist in most countries.  Advisory services for farms and small firms, for example on new
crops or farming techniques or on business management are also widespread.  However,
the most complete review of studies on the experience with such schemes worldwide
suggests that very few schemes have been seriously evaluated.58 Overall, many remain
56 Smaller firms can in particular overcome the problem of incentives to train as long as they are able to
employ apprentices at very low wages  as happens in a number of countries.  Many people may then choose
to learn at low wages in small firms in the expectation of higher income later rather than taking on an
initially better paid job with the state, which, however, tends to yield a lower lifetime  income.  However,
where labor regulations prohibit low wages  for apprentices,  small firms may not have the right incentives  to
invest in training.
57 Fleisig, 1995.
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ineffective or are abused, in particular subsidized schemes. The key hypothesis that
emerges from existing experience is that the schemes with the greatest chance of working
well are those aligned with basic market principles.  Decent credit support programs tend
to avoid subsidized credit terms. Sound approaches  to advisory services tend to
emphasize creation of demand for such services and delivery via market mechanisms.  In
addition,  special support schemes seem to require a sound basic overall policy framework
for markets where they operate.
Industrial policy.  Special government  support for domestic firms of all types has
typically been discussed under the heading of "infant industry" protection or "industrial
policy", even though other sectors might be affected as well, such as services or
agriculture.  Essentially industrial policy consists of a mix of policies that create room for
domestic firms to leam and to obtain finance so as to improve productivity.  In a great
number of countries such policies have been a disappointment.  The above-cited  case of
the Indian machine tool industry provides an example,  where a protected industry has not
used protection to leam but to be satisfied with substandard performance.  However,
particularly  in East Asian economies  like Japan and Korea industrial policy is often seen
to have helped.  A recent study examined productivity performance  in Japan and Korea
sector by sector (figure 15).  It tums out that the sectors that benefited from special
support contributed only a modest amount to productivity growth.  Overall, even in the
two arguably most successful cases industrial policy has at best been a small factor for
success.
Figure 15: The effect of Industrial policy on growth of total factor productivity in the  manufacturing
sector and aggregate  growth  (average annual  rate of growth)
Korea - 1966-1985  Japan - 1960-1979
Xt00  900  880  V00  900  867
8a00  800-
600*  600-
400-  32  400-  236
200  200  137
With industrial policy  Without industrial  With industrial policy  Without industrial
policy  Policy
OTFPgrowth  gGDPgrowth  OTFPgrowth  iGOPgrowth
Note: This analysis is based on the assumption that the growth in manufacturing sector
accounted for only a third of the growth in GDP in both Korea  and Japan. The TFP
growth figures relate to the manufacturing sector only and not to the whole economy.
Source.  Pack (2000).
Clearly, to be successful  industrial policy needs to expose the firms that are supported to
some form of serious competition, for example, by tying continued support to export
success in truly competitive markets  as in the case of Korea and Japan.59  Openness to
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best practice and exposure of firms to the selection mechanism of competition is critical
for government intervention to help.  Even analysts who question economic orthodoxy
and are open to "heterodox"  approaches conclude that "we do not want to leave the
impression that we think trade protection is good for economic growth.  We know of no
credible evidence - at least for the post- 1945 period - that suggests that trade restrictions
are systematically  associated with higher growth rates."60
The politics  of support schemes.  Whatever form of government intervention in support
of access to finance or learning one may consider for small and large firms, in urban or
rural areas, basic market forces  appear needed to give these policies a chance to succeed.
It may also be that the interventions "work" in places where otherwise sound institutions
and policies are in place anyway.61  Note that among successful special schemes such as
export promotion,  industrial policy, and the like, the same small group of  countries is
mentioned again and again - particularly Japan, Korea and Singapore.62
Doubts about their effectiveness  have not reduced the attraction of various forms of
government  support schemes, for example those for small and medium sized firms, which
are popular all over the world.  Other subsidy schemes are widespread as well and the
evidence  about their effectiveness  is neither stronger nor weaker.  However, they meet
with a bit more skepticism such as special fiscal incentives for foreign direct investment
or some agricultural  support schemes in major OECD economies.  This suggests that it
may well be that the drivers for support schemes have in fact little to do with economic
considerations per se. They may mostly be part of the political give-and-take of any
nation.  In particular, the spread of best practices and more productive job upsets old
patterns of production,  typically disrupts the lives of some people all the while it
improves those of others and in the end is the way to raise living standards broadly.  The
support schemes may thus help good policy because they may moderate the pain of
adjustment  and help build political backing for it.  However,  they may also help entrench
vested interests and the survival of inefficient firms and thus hold back productivity
growth.
Insurance schemes.  A major issue for policy-making is thus how to deal with demands
for special support schemes.  On the one hand political acceptability may require such
schemes.  On the other hand they must be designed not to undermine the workings of
sound markets and the development of world-class capability in firms.  While the politics
of each country probably require somewhat different approaches, there may be one
general principle to consider.  As has been discussed above, the creation of successful
ventures or firms requires taking risks.  Experimentation is needed and failure is
unavoidable.  People are more likely to take risks when they know that there is some
safety net to fall back on in case of failure.  A sensible social safety net is thus good for
efficiency and growth, not just for equity and fairness.  For example, the institution of
limited liability, which limits the losses of business owners, has helped promote
60 Rodriguez and Rodnk, 2000.
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entrepreneurship.  Small farmers are more likely to invest in risky ventures when they
have a way of insuring themselves.
Political acceptability and economic efficiency may thus best be helped by designing
forms of insurance appropriate for a particular economy.  For example, large-scale
unemployment  insurance can be afforded by advanced  economies.  Smaller insurance
schemes  are practical in poor countries.  This would include micro-finance  programs,
which are mostly not used to fund investment but to help deal with temporary inability to
pay for consumption  and which spread default risk among small groups of people.63
The New  Swedish  Model.  The general picture that thus emerges for desirable
government policy might be termed the "New Swedish Model".  Before the 1990s,
Swedish economic policy was often looked at as a "third way" between capitalism and
socialism. After the economic crisis of the early 1990s Sweden  and several other
Scandinavian countries have remodeled themselves.  The cornerstones of the current
model are:
*  prudent macro-economic policies and low inflation;64
*  a highly competitive environment for firms with few barriers to entry and growth
and minimum red tape (figure  16); and
*  a strong social safety net.
Figure 1i: Lower levels of regulation in Sweden
Number  of procedures  Number of days it takes  Index of formalism  in
needed  to  to  court enforcement
register a business  register a business
Svveden  OECD  Ird'lSwede  OECD  irdn!  Sweden  OECD  bIl'
Average  Average  Average  Average  Average  Average
Note: The index of formalism  measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower
level civil trail courts.
Source: Doing  Business Database
As countries advance, the complexity and average  size of institutions, be they firms or
government agencies  or other forms of organizations,  increases.  The share of
government in total economic activity also increases,  not because government interferes
with production decisions and the ecology of firms, but because of the growth of transfer
payments that lie behind the social safety net of advanced societies, which in turn
63 Morduch,  1999.
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supports risk-taking in the productive sectors.  The "New  Swedish Model", whether we
call it "capitalism with a heart" or "socialism with a head" appears to be the main avenue
ahead.
Partial and heterodox reform.  The question remains how good governance in society
at large arises and what can be done to promote it.  A critical point is that we do not know
how to engineer good governance.  It is perfectly possible and plausible that pure chance
and luck play a large role in the creation of successful societies.65 It is equally clear that
highly incomplete reforms have to be sufficient for growth to take off.  Otherwise no
country could ever have developed.  For example,  countries like Bangladesh or China
have seen progress, admittedly of varying degrees, by pursuing only partial reforms and
despite continuing  and pervasive governance issues.  It is also clear that many successful
countries have pursued policy mixes that appear "heterodox",  like Japan, Korea, China or
Vietnam. Others have successfully pursued relatively "orthodox" policies like Chile and
El Salvador, again with success of varying degrees.  But partial reform and heterodox
policy may equally be associated with arrested development as in the case of countries
that unsuccessfully pursued import substitution.  Likewise  a heavy dose of orthodoxy has
not by itself helped some countries,  for example in Latin America, to grow rapidly.
Creative destruction.  Also successful development may require destruction of vested
interests, i.e. some  form of revolution.66 It can thus be quite disruptive for some time
with unavoidable winners and losers.  Arguably Germany,  Japan, Korea and Taiwan all
benefited to some degree from the disruption of war and from policies in part imposed by
the United  States after World War II.  It remains unclear how much disruption is
unavoidable and how much disruption is excessive.
Competition  among jurisdictions.  Given the uncertainty about the exact mix of
reforms and institutional change that makes for successful development, it must surely be
valuable to allow experimentation with different mixes of institutional and governance
reform.  The reason we have advanced economies today is the industrial revolution that
came out of Europe.  Competition among squabbling European states and principalities
led to the world's growth miracle, the "European Miracle" as historian Edwin Jones
called it.67 China, the previously more advanced nation was left behind, however, as
central control and the domination of  mandarins over merchants arrested development.
So for the development of good governance  a selection mechanism is also important,
namely competition among nations, or more generally among various types of
jurisdictions - across states or within, for example, federal systems.  Both for the firm
and the government,  a symbiosis of competition and rule-based co-operation seems
required for complex societies to emerge and to allow their citizens to prosper.
To sum up, effective wealth creation requires capable institutions.  A complex symbiosis
of competition and co-operation on the basis of accepted rules characterizes  successful
65  Easterly,  2001.
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societies. Some basic measures to establish such societies are known, for example respect
for property rights and contracts as well as freedom for firms of all types to enter markets
as well as freedom to fail.  Just as we cannot predict exactly which type of firm will
succeed so we cannot predict which type of government policy and institutional mix will
be most successful.  Competition among jurisdictions  is as important to institutional
development as that among firms.  We have leamed some basics on how to facilitate
development, but we do not know how to engineer it and have to remain open to
experiments.  Hopefully we can improve the chances of success of unavoidable
experiments by studying in more detail the way markets, firms and governments
interact.68
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